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Abstract

Theories of the fertility transition now routinely reserve a place for
diffusion effects. Two fundamental behavioral mechanisms account for such
effects: social learning and social influence. Social learning refers to the
acquisition of information from others. The information might have to do
with a new technology or with the health, social, and economic consequences of decisions. In the case of fertility, individuals might learn from
others about the availability of a new contraceptive, or about health side
effects of certain contraceptives, or about the apparent gains and losses
from having fewer children and investing in their schooling. Social influence refers to the power that individuals exercise over each other through
authority, deference, and social conformity pressures. Our aim in this paper is threefold: to assemble the disparate concepts of the diffusion perspective into a coherent whole; to review the literature in and outside demography in the light of these concepts; and to present simulations and
new data on the role of social networks, through which social learning
takes place and social influence is exercised. Throughout the paper, we
illustrate the issues with applications to Ghana, one of the sites being explored in new longitudinal research.

This material may not be reproduced in any form without written permission
from the authors.

Theories of the fertility transition now routinely reserve a place for diffusion effects (Mason 1997). Such effects arise because individuals are themselves
members of larger groups. The information that is held by group members, the
choices they make, and the outcomes that flow from them can all exert a powerful influence on individual incentives to innovate. In settings in which fertility
has been high, such innovation may take the form of modern contraceptive adoption and fertility limitation. Under certain conditions, the individual-to-group
connections establish pathways along which such innovative demographic behavior can diffuse.
What empirical evidence supports the view that diffusion matters to fertility decline? As we will show, proponents can find in the fertility literature numerous hints and indirect suggestions of a role for diffusion. Until very recently,
however, the available data were insufficient to withstand rigorous scientific scrutiny. In the past three years, several groups of researchers have become engaged in
long-term investigations that may better illuminate the contribution of diffusion.1
With the study of diffusion effects about to enter a new phase, this is an appropriate moment to take stock of what has been learned and to describe the new research directions that lie ahead.
OVERVIEW
Our aim in this paper is threefold: to assemble the disparate concepts of the
diffusion perspective into a coherent whole; to review the literature in and outside demography in the light of these concepts; and to present simulations and
new data on the role of social networks, which we take to be one of the key
mechanisms in diffusion processes. Throughout the paper, we illustrate the issues
with applications to Ghana, one of the sites being explored in new longitudinal
research. The effort to understand the specifics of the Ghanaian case requires that
concepts and illustrations be drawn from the broader literature in social science
and fertility change.

In our view, diffusion modeling can be regarded as a special case of multilevel modeling. It is distinctive in two respects: first, consideration of diffusion
emphasizes a particular set of individual-to-group connections, those associated
with information exchange and innovation; and second, it focuses attention on
dynamic implications. If they are appropriately structured, the channels by which
individuals are connected to groups can permit and even facilitate wholesale behavioral change—the dynamics can take the form of “cascade,” “contagion,”
and “tipping point” phenomena. That diffusion effects have the potential to accelerate social change is well recognized; but it is less well understood that depending on social setting, they may also stifle innovation and bind individuals
more tightly to the status quo.
In other work (Montgomery and Casterline 1996), we have argued that
diffusion is best analyzed in terms of its two defining features: social learning
and social influence. The concept of social learning is pertinent to environments
that are characterized by flux and uncertainty, in which new choice options are
coming to the fore but with associated costs and benefits that are not yet well
understood. In such transitional settings, one individual may seek to understand
the consequences of a new private decision, and may probe in various directions
hoping to clarify the nature of its potential benefits and costs. The decision in
question could be entirely novel, as in the case of adoption of a new technology,
or socially novel in the sense that, among that person’s peers, such decisions had
previously been uncommon. Information about choices may be drawn from the
individual’s reference groups, the set of other persons with whom information is
exchanged or who provide models illustrating the links between choice and outcome. We will describe the various reference groups and linkages as “social networks.” Social learning thus encompasses both the social aspects of information
acquisition and the filtering or distillation of that information into terms that are
meaningful to individual choice.
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Social influence is a rather different concept. It refers to the collective power
of institutions, structures of authority, and social groups to establish the larger
context within which individuals must evaluate their private decisions. As individuals learn about the nature of the new choices, they may find that various
groups, institutions, or local elites are positioned either to facilitate those choices
or to constrain them. But such social structures are themselves rarely immutable
or impervious to influence, and their nature may well change with the prevalence
of innovation. For instance, social norms favoring high fertility may dissolve or
be reconfigured as modern contraceptive use spreads.
Contraceptive adoption
The adoption of modern contraception may be strongly influenced by diffusion effects. One aspect of social learning has to do with the properties of contraceptive methods themselves—their levels of efficacy, where they may be obtained, the associated monetary and social costs, and the potential side effects of
use. These are doubtless central concerns in settings where few people use contraception. Even in high-prevalence settings, however, the distribution of contraceptive knowledge will be uneven, and in certain groups, at least, social learning
can continue to play an important role. The life-cycle aspect of learning also
warrants study. Whatever the prevalence of contraception among adults, adolescents will have much left to learn about the nature and consequences of method
use. They will often refer to the behavior of peers and others for guidance; and
adolescents may find themselves constrained by peer group norms or by the institutionalized service delivery practices of family planning programs.
The scope for social learning is much broader than this focus on methods
and means would suggest. In developing countries, where many society-wide
transformations are underway, individuals may need to rely on social learning in
order to extract the meaning for themselves of these larger forces. For example,
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social learning may be much involved in individual perceptions of mortality decline (Montgomery 1998) and in the effort to understand the risks and benefits of
heavy investments in children’s education. Learning in these dimensions involves
issues distinct from the properties of contraceptive methods, but such learning
could ultimately be expressed through contraceptive use.
Thus, there is merit in thinking broadly about the roles of diffusion and
social influence. By no means does the adoption of a diffusionist perspective
require one to abandon concern for socioeconomic determinants. Rather, the diffusion perspective helps to enrich understanding of the full force of these determinants. It draws attention to their role in forming the local social structure; and
it introduces a distinction between their direct impacts and their spillover or social multiplier effects.
Social multipliers and programs
When seen from the viewpoint of reproductive health programs, the recognition of diffusion effects opens a new window on program evaluation. The
essence of a diffusion dynamic is that the information or behavior of one person—let us say, a contraceptive adopter—can have spillover effects on the
motivations of another—say, a potential adopter. This spillover effect, or informational externality, can be either positive or negative in character. That is,
when considered by the potential adopter, the experience of an earlier user can
help to tip the balance toward contraceptive use or can serve to dissuade the
potential adopter.
Consider a case in which a family planning program reaches one person
directly with services and information. If this person uses contraception, the program can rightly claim a portion of the credit. The diffusion perspective suggests
that second-round, social multiplier effects also need consideration. When the
example of the first contraceptive user persuades another person to adopt, the
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program might legitimately claim some measure of credit for the second adoption as well. Although it would be difficult to properly apportion this credit, the
basic principle is that program effects extend beyond those individuals who are
directly influenced by the program.
Once this principle is accepted, it implies the need to reconsider not only
the social dimension of program effects, but also the geographic dimension. When
different geographic areas are linked by social network ties, program efforts directed at one area can exert a spillover influence on contraceptive use in another.
By emphasizing pathways such as these, the consideration of diffusion dynamics
forces a rethinking of the conventional evaluation framework.
This much has long been known. Indeed, one of the earliest experimental
interventions in family planning—the Taichung experiment, reviewed below—
underscored the significance of social multiplier and geographic spillover effects
in contraceptive knowledge and adoption. The difficulty has been to properly
estimate the size of these effects, and thereby understand the practical implications for evaluation. This task requires both rich longitudinal data and an appropriate conceptual and statistical apparatus. One longitudinal analysis (Montgomery and Casterline 1993) has found that in the case of Taiwan, estimates of family
planning program effectiveness were greatly modified by consideration of diffusion dynamics. A conventional analysis of program impact, which ignored diffusion, suggested that no more than 5 to 20 percent of marital fertility decline could
be attributed to program efforts. When the social multiplier effects of diffusion
were taken into account, however, the estimates of program impact rose to over
30 percent.
Does the diffusion perspective also provide clear lessons for program design? The 1993 National Academy of Sciences report, Factors Affecting Contraceptive Use in sub-Saharan Africa, linked social networks to the prospects for
increases in contraception,
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The challenge for policy . . . is how to seize on the themes and motivations brought out by economic stagnation and crisis in a cost-efficient way, recognizing that initially the appeal of family limitation
will not be in evidence across the full socioeconomic spectrum, and
even the appeal of birth spacing via modern contraception may be
resisted in some traditional quarters. One proposal, advanced by
Lesthaeghe, is to exploit the concept of diffusion and the potential
presented by sub-Saharan forms of local social organization.
It is clear that the provision of information and the social legitimation of modern contraception will be crucial to the prospects for service delivery. Given the budgetary constraints and limitations of
personnel with which sub-Saharan governments must cope, national
delivery strategies must tap a variety of local social networks. . . .
(National Academy of Sciences 1993:122–123)
The report went on to discuss the possible roles of local women’s groups,
marketing associations, local political associations, mutual aid and rotating credit
groups, and traditional birth attendants, as well as various church and youth associations. This theme was echoed in Bongaarts and Bruce (1995), who asked how
local African social structures and traditional community institutions might become involved in efforts to reduce “unmet need” for birth spacing. They envisioned a role for such institutions in the organization of service delivery and in
the diffusion of information.
Although the potential exists, it is too soon to say whether the diffusion
perspective will have a major impact on program design. In the Navrongo experiment, a large-scale family planning intervention set in northern Ghana (Nazzar
et al. 1995), local social, religious, and political institutions have been enlisted in
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support of an innovative program of doorstep delivery of modern contraception.
A longitudinal evaluation of diffusion dynamics is also underway.
With the preceding overview serving as background, we have organized
the next sections of the paper as follows. We first provide a more formal definition of the concepts of social learning and social influence, the two fundamental
components of diffusion theory. We then review the demographic and related
social science literature on diffusion modeling; present results from an analytical
simulation model of diffusion, with emphasis on the contribution of social networks; and provide empirical data from Ghana on social networks and contraceptive use in that context. In closing, we set out our conclusions.
KEY CONCEPTS
In developing countries, most adults are keenly aware of the flux and new
uncertainties of their social environments. Mortality decline is underway, although
its extent may be only dimly perceived; the prospects for wresting a living from
agriculture may be threatened or undergoing radical change; new forms of human capital investments in children must be considered; and the perceived costs
of children are often shifting in ways that might motivate lower fertility. In addition to this, most adults understand that new technologies are available for the
control of fertility, with the new methods often being promoted by information
and education campaigns and provided through government and private health
services. Yet, each new decision option presents social and economic risks as
well as potential benefits. In consequence, individuals will make use of information drawn from many sources to help resolve the uncertainties facing them and
to clarify the benefits and costs associated with their private decisions.
In such environments, social learning may be described as follows. Consider an individual i at time t. In weighing alternatives and making decisions, this
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person refers to an information set Ii,t, which summarizes his or her knowledge of
all factors that might bear on decisions. Some aspects of the decision environment are not known with certainty, and these must be represented in terms of
subjective expectations and measures of uncertainty. Such knowledge may have
been created by the mingling of different sources of information, some of it being
impersonal, such as knowledge gleaned from the mass media, and some of it
personal in the sense of being inferred from the experiences or views of others
with whom the individual interacts.
Particularly relevant for innovation is the individual’s knowledge regarding what economists call “equations of motion.” These equations represent an
individual’s perceptions of the link between an action or choice undertaken at
time t, let us say ct, and the distribution of possible consequences, say yt+1. Consider the case of the IUD, which has only recently been introduced to Ghana. One
equation of motion might describe the long-term effects of adopting the IUD on
a woman’s future state of health; associated with it would be her expectations
and subjective uncertainties regarding these consequences. A Ghanaian woman
who has heard of the IUD might wish to know about such health implications,
and might be concerned with how her husband might react and what strategies
she can draw upon in spousal negotiations. On these matters, rumors or confidences imparted by friends about the IUD might be distinguished from the information that the woman has distilled from media campaigns.
The information set Ii,t thus includes a listing and description of other individuals Ni,t, a set of persons whose actions, communications, or perceived traits
might help person i to resolve uncertainties. The various members of Ni,t may be
sorted into groups (which themselves may overlap), some of which can be described as personal social networks. Social learning takes place interpersonally
when the other actors in Ni,t supply information that shapes person i ’s subjective
beliefs about the equations of motion or other decision parameters. These actors
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may also function as resources to be sampled when person i wishes to gather
additional data.
Learning can be said to take place impersonally when, for example, knowledge is gleaned from the media. The boundary between interpersonal and impersonal sources is admittedly indistinct. Information obtained from the media is
often passed on and evaluated through further social interaction (Hornik and
McAnany 1998). Contacts with family planning programs often have both an
interpersonal and an impersonal character.
The concept of social influence overlaps, to a degree, with the concepts of
social learning and information sets, but is in many ways distinct. The term refers
to the effects of interpersonal interactions that derive their power from factors
that are intrinsically “social” and that are expressed in individuals’ preferences
and constraints as well as in their information sets. A vast literature in social
psychology demonstrates the power of pressure toward social conformity in
groups; see the comprehensive reviews by Moscovici (1985) and Cialdini and
Trost (1998). A different form of social influence is expressed in concepts such as
authority, power, and deference. In Ghana, men often exercise authority over
women and define for them the limits of appropriate behavior. Senior women
living in a household compound, such as the wife of a compound head, may
exercise control over junior women. Senior men and women together may function as “gate-keepers,” who restrict the movements of younger women (and to
some degree, younger men) outside of the compound (see the description of northern Ghana by Adongo et al. 1997). In terms of our conceptual model, these hierarchical and power-based influences can be interpreted as additional constraints
on individual behavior, or as a set of (psychic) costs facing the junior woman
who contemplates innovative but deviant behavior.
In short, the reference groups and social networks embedded in Ni,t can
influence fertility through several distinct behavioral mechanisms. First, the in-
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formation they provide may expand the set of reproductive choices known to the
woman. Second, behavior within Ni,t can provide empirical demonstrations of the
range of consequences that can follow from the adoption of a particular reproductive choice ct, and may thereby shape the woman’s subjective probability
distributions and equations of motion. The third way in which Ni,t enters is through
effects on preferences, that is, through social influence effects, conformity pressures, and so on.
Suppose that woman i, having weighed the options and the attendant uncertainties, decides that she will adopt contraception at time t. Then, at time t+1,
woman i may play a new role as a reference point in the social networks of all
other women, Nj,t+1, to which she belongs. For such women, i ’s experience may
add to the accumulation of evidence in favor of modern contraceptive use. Whether
this occurs depends on the degree to which woman i ’s contraceptive use is public
knowledge, or is shielded by a screen of privacy that is lifted only when she
decides to do so (Phillips et al. 1997a). The informational content of her experience also depends on how woman i herself perceives the experience: she may
find a newly adopted contraceptive method disagreeable or its health side effects
disturbing and be willing to broadcast this view to others.
There should be no presumption that social effects must reinforce innovation. One gets the impression from research in developing countries that conversation about modern contraception is far more often negative than positive, with
stories about extreme negative health repercussions of contraceptives often dominating the discussion (for Senegal, see Ngom 1995). Even in the contemporary
United States, views regarding the potential health risks posed by contraceptive
methods such as the pill or IUD have included considerable misperception, and
this may well have resulted in long-term changes in the U. S. contraceptive method
mix. Similar misconceptions are widespread in Ghana, as has been documented
by Adibo (1992), Adongo et al. (1997), and Agyeman et al. (1996). Health scares,
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backlashes, the disapproval of local elites, the public failure of innovators—all
these social effects frustrate rather than encourage innovation.
A social effects model emphasizing the role of networks Ni,t is incomplete
unless it addresses the issue of how such networks are formed and interlinked,
and whether network membership is constant over time or varies with the lifecycle stage of the individual or other circumstances. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, the dynamics implied by a diffusion model cannot be described
unless that model can explain who is connected to whom. There are clearly linguistic and geographic boundaries on network formation, but there must also be
other social and economic factors that determine Ni,t.
The content of learning
To this point, our discussion has emphasized the properties of contraceptive methods as the subject of information exchange, but social learning with
respect to other issues may be equally or more important. One sees in Ghana the
beginnings of a quantity-quality transition, whereby some families are having
fewer children and investing more heavily in the education of each child. This
innovation is more characteristic of urban than of rural areas, but even rural areas
have begun to participate. To a rural couple, however, surrounded by family elders and living in what remains a largely traditional environment, the full implications of the new schooling and fertility strategies must seem uncertain indeed.
How can they persuade themselves of the wisdom of this new course, if not by
reference to the experiences and views of others who have already embarked on it?
In considering these two arenas of choice, one concerned with the costs of
fertility regulation and the other with its long-term benefits, we see that the time
spans required for outcome y to be revealed may be very different. The health
implications of using the pill or the IUD might be known in a matter of months or
a few years; the risks and rewards of educating one’s children, however, might
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not be known for decades. In the latter case, family i might have to rely on the
experiences of the very early adopters of the lower-fertility, higher-schooling
strategy, and these adopters might be found in socioeconomic circumstances very
different from its own. Family i might also solicit the views and opinions of the
other couples in its networks in an effort to better understand the educational
“equations of motion.” No one might have any direct experience to recount, but
each couple in the network might relate stories heard at second-hand, and offer
its predictions as to the likely outcomes of educating children.
The costs of sampling and network formation are also different in the two
cases. Where contraception is concerned, there is always an element of privacy
and potential embarrassment to consider. To engage in a discussion about such
intimate matters, or even to broach the subject, may risk exposure to criticism or
to social sanctions (Phillips et al. 1997a). We might distinguish between the fixed
costs that person i anticipates in first opening the subject with person j, and the
costs of any subsequent discussion, which would presumably be lower. Costs
probably assume less importance in obtaining information about schooling, this
being a neutral subject open to free discussion. Knowledge about schooling might
therefore have the character of a local public good, with information being exchanged easily among members of networks or wider social groups. Information
about contraception, on the other hand, would more closely resemble a private
good, available to the interested woman or couple only at an (implicit) price.
Whether it is information about schooling or about contraceptive methods
that diffuses, new reproductive ideas will often be expressed through changes in
contraceptive use. Trends in use, however, do not in themselves shed light on the
nature of the information that has been exchanged. Offsetting positive and negative messages about contraception may both be exchanged, so that the net change
in the prevalence of use is not revealing of the salience of the information that
was communicated. Moreover, contraceptive use may serve only as a signal of
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the diffusion of more fundamental messages on the motivations for childrearing,
and these messages need not have any direct connection to the properties of contraceptive methods themselves.
The foregoing discussion may help to clarify the differences between social learning regarding reproductive strategies, on the one hand, and learning in
the context of agricultural innovation, on the other. As discussed in the next section, there is a long tradition of research on why farmers adopt or fail to adopt
new agricultural practices, and this literature can be a fruitful source of insights
and analogies. In the agricultural case, the treatment or choice ct made by one
farmer (e.g., the adoption of a new high-yielding seed) can be easily observed by
others, and one need wait only until the end of an agricultural season to know the
outcome yt+1. The village or some other geographically defined area can serve as
the natural sample frame for each farmer, and within this frame a farmer can
update his subjective beliefs without much consideration of sampling costs (Besley
and Case 1993). By contrast, in settings such as northern Ghana, where modern
contraception is thought to be socially threatening to men and women take pains
to guard their privacy, the costs of information-gathering on contraception are
probably high.
In both the agricultural and reproductive spheres, a problem arises in how
to draw lessons from other actors who are situated in circumstances very different from one’s own.2 Presumably what is relevant about the experiences of others
is the link between their choices ct and their outcomes yt+1. If the connections
between choice and outcome are situation-specific, then it is difficult to know
precisely how one family’s experiments with a new reproductive strategy may
prove relevant to another’s. This may explain the apparent failure of fertility
regulation practices to diffuse for many generations in some settings—for example, from European colonizers to native Africans, and from the upper to the
lower social strata in Latin America (Rosero-Bixby and Casterline 1993). The
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value of information gained through network Ni,t may therefore depend on the socioeconomic circumstances of network members relative to i ’s own circumstances.
Taken to the extreme, this would suggest that family i should populate its
networks with peers, i.e., with those most like itself in respect to the socioeconomic factors that affect the equations of motion. The difficulty, however, is that
the homogeneous groups formed by this sampling strategy may not generate sufficient diversity of information. There may also be an advantage to sampling the
experiences of non-peers, whose choices ct and outcomes yt+1 may better reveal
the full range of possible behaviors and consequences. Depending on the innovation in question, then, network Ni,t may be composed both of peers and of nonpeers drawn from different social groups or strata. Again, the costs of forming
network contacts must be taken into consideration, as it may be more difficult to
forge a direct connection with another person who is distant in a socioeconomic
or geographic sense.
Extending the analysis somewhat, we might consider the information on
new reproductive strategies that is provided by impersonal and even fictional
contacts, such as characters found on television (Faria and Potter 1994) or in the
movies. These characters often embody new ideas and exemplify in their actions
the conflicts between the old and new ways of thinking and behaving. They can
provide models of new forms of consumption behavior, which may stimulate
individual i’s aspirations for various consumer goods. They also show how conflicts might be resolved and what negotiating tactics among spouses or relatives
might prove successful.
We have sketched a point of view about rational individual decisionmakers
who are faced with choices in new and uncertain environments. We have argued
that they are likely to make decisions on the basis of information drawn from
their personal social networks, local social organizations, influential elites, the
mass media, and program personnel. Having made their own judgments as to the
best reproductive strategy open to them, individuals contemplating innovative
16

choices may find that others are positioned either to constrain or to facilitate such
choices, acting on authority derived from roles such as spouse, compound gatekeeper, political or religious leader, or the like. The social dynamics of innovative behavior are therefore complex. Theory alone cannot provide clear guidance
on the magnitude—or even the direction—of such social effects.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
With these concepts in mind, we turn to the literature on diffusion modeling. A notable development in contemporary social science is the parallel evolution, across a number of disciplines, of ways of thinking about change that can be
described in terms of diffusion. In other work (Montgomery and Casterline 1996),
we have reviewed research in the fields of sociology, economics, and psychology; taken collectively, these fields have much to offer the demographer and
program evaluator. In what follows, we will summarize the demographic research
on diffusion and then, more briefly, review recent contributions from economics
and sociology.
The demographic literature
Within demography, much of the current interest in diffusion effects can
be traced to two influential studies: the family planning experiments conducted
in 1964 in Taichung, Taiwan (see Palmore and Freedman 1969; Lu et al. 1967)
and the European Fertility Study (see Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Watkins
1987). Curiously, of these two, the Taichung research is more persuasive on scientific grounds, but it is the European results that seem to have captured the
imagination of the current generation of demographers.
The Taichung study, based on a randomized experiment and longitudinal
follow-up, showed how the effects of direct program interventions targeted to
some individuals can be spread to others who were not directly contacted by the
program. These effects clearly illustrate how program impacts can be magnified
17

by personal social networks. Retherford and Palmore (1983) provide a comprehensive review of the Taichung and other early Asian studies, emphasizing the
role of such informal networks.
In contrast to the individual-level observations that formed the basis for
the Taichung experiment, the European studies were based on aggregated areal
data with a time-series dimension. Creatively using maps and other illustrative
devices, Leasure (1962) and Lesthaeghe (1977) detected remarkable spatial, ethnic, and linguistic patterns in the fertility transitions of Spain and Belgium. The
Belgian case (Lesthaeghe 1977) is particularly interesting, in that it documents
clear linguistic boundaries to fertility change separating adjacent urban neighborhoods, this being suggestive of social barriers to information transmission.
Other scholars (Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Cleland and Wilson 1987; Watkins
1987) put emphasis on the apparent simultaneity of fertility declines across Europe and on the rapid pace of demographic change once the transitions were
engaged.3 The European studies suggest that the links between fertility decline
and conventional measures of socioeconomic development are weak—a muchdisputed position (Galloway et al. 1994; Richards 1977)—thereby arriving at
diffusion processes and “ideational change” as residual explanations for fertility
decline.
The European evidence, although intriguing, is far from conclusive. Rapid
and discontinuous change in fertility is consistent with a diffusion dynamic, but
it is also consistent with conventional fertility models (Retherford 1985). The
fact that fertility change observes linguistic or cultural boundaries is likewise
consistent both with diffusion and with alternative perspectives. Furthermore, as
we established above, a well-formulated diffusion model must reserve a place for
conventional social and economic factors. The notion that diffusion constitutes a
wholly distinct class of explanation does not withstand scrutiny.
Recent empirical research has continued to add findings supportive of diffu-
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sion hypotheses. In the longitudinal analysis mentioned above, Montgomery and
Casterline (1993) present suggestive results for Taiwan based on aggregate crosssectional and time-series data. Similar approaches were followed by Rosero-Bixby
and Casterline (1994), Tolnay (1995), Land and Deane (1991), and Munshi and Myaux
(1998). These authors acknowledge a discomfort with aggregate data and argue that
proper tests require multi-level data on individuals and their social networks.
Until very recently, only one effort had been made to assemble such data:
the pioneering work of Everett Rogers and colleagues (summarized in Rogers
and Kincaid 1981) on social networks and contraceptive use in rural Korea.4 The
Korean data, although rich in network detail, are cross-sectional and therefore
cannot furnish the basis for tests of diffusion. Subsequent research by Valente
and colleagues in Cameroon (Valente et al. 1997), by Entwisle and colleagues in
Thailand (Entwisle and Godley 1998), by Watkins and colleagues in Kenya
(Watkins et al. 1995; Green 1998), coupled with our own efforts in Ghana (summarized briefly below and in Montgomery and Zhao 1998) have contributed new
cross-sectional studies of social networks and contraceptive use. Until the longitudinal dimension of these studies can be filled in, they too must be regarded as
making suggestive rather than definitive contributions.
Other research traditions
Social effects, broadly defined, have long been at the center of sociological theory and research. See, for example, the review of research in social psychology in Cialdini and Trost (1998) and the theoretical essays in Hedström and
Swedberg (1998). More directly relevant to the research agenda described here is
the study of social networks, which in itself is a well-developed subfield of sociology. It is the domain of two journals, Social Networks and Connections, and the
central preoccupation of a literature too vast to summarize here. Recent articles
that draw out the implications for diffusion are Marsden and Friedkin (1993) and
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Strang (1991); a recent summary is Marsden (1998). Granovetter and Soong (1983,
1986) developed analytic methods that Valente (1995) later adapted to the study
of contraceptive use. Branches of social and cognitive psychology (Carley 1998;
Nowak et al. 1990) have also been concerned with social learning processes.
The literature on diffusion in agricultural economics has likewise been a
major source of hypotheses and analogies (see Griliches 1957 for an early contribution and Feder et al. 1985 for an insightful review). As noted above, one can
see parallels in the situation of poor farmers considering adoption of high-yielding seeds and of poor men and women considering the adoption of contraception.
The analogies are sometimes superficial or inexact, but they often merit serious
consideration. Besley and Case (1993), Munshi (1994), and Foster and Rosenzweig
(1994) have analyzed agricultural decisions in a manner that has clear applicability to demographic innovation.
Outside agricultural economics, however, interest in diffusion and related
social effects is a comparatively recent phenomenon. In the 1990s, such research
has belatedly flourished as a number of economists pursued analyses of social
learning, information cascades, social interaction, and diffusion, often in models
in which individuals are assumed to be identical apart from the information they
possess.5 Much of this literature is theoretical, a notable exception being McFadden
and Train (1996).
A closely related literature is concerned with “interdependent preferences”
(see Pollak 1976; Alessie and Kapteyn 1991; and Kapteyn et al. 1997). The theme
pursued by these authors is the interconnection among individuals of demands
for consumer goods. In making decisions about consumption, individuals are
assumed to be influenced by the consumption behavior exhibited in their reference groups. This is a potentially fruitful area for demographic research, in the
sense that consumption aspirations may have an indirect yet fundamental influence on the demand for children.
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A DYNAMIC SIMULATION MODEL
Having highlighted the central roles of social networks and information
exchange within the theory of diffusion processes, we now ask how these roles
might be revealed in empirical data. The key question is whether the effects of
diffusion can be identified and the magnitudes estimated. Formidable difficulties
confront this task. Indeed, in the view of some skeptics, the effort to estimate
diffusion models must founder on an intractable complex of problems. If the
skeptics are right and there is little hope of estimating proper causal models, then
the diffusion hypothesis will likely remain no more than a tantalizing theoretical
possibility.
The skeptics have powerful arguments on their side—see Durlauf and
Walker (1998) for an insightful presentation—but it would be premature to cede
the field to them. The essence of the problem is that when a diffusion model is
specified in full generality, it admits too many possibilities and lacks sufficient
structure for diffusion effects to be precisely and confidently identified. Additional social-structural assumptions are therefore needed; but, of course, these
assumptions cannot be imposed arbitrarily. The structural assumptions must be
grounded in detailed, specific knowledge of the local social context. The need for
local detail then precludes certain types of empirical investigation, for example,
large national samples involving hundreds of heterogeneous clusters and communities. It implies a rather different mode of research, one that is based in wellunderstood communities or regions.
Given research designs such as these, three related modes of inquiry are
required. First, careful, demographically realistic analytic simulations are required
to draw out the data needs of diffusion modeling and to highlight the empirical
regularities that demand closest attention. Second, since so little is known about
social networks in developing countries, rich descriptive information is needed
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on these networks in the local context. Third, the properties of newly developed
econometric techniques need to be carefully assessed, first through application to
simulated data and then to actual data from the study communities.
With these aims in mind, in what follows we present the early returns from
an analytic simulation model based, to the extent possible, on the Ghanaian context. The model is constructed so as to expose the dynamic implications of different social network configurations. In the simulation context, one can manipulate
the key parameters describing these networks and then investigate the effects on
such outcome measures as contraceptive use or knowledge. This approach is
useful in understanding the data that will be required for effective empirical work.
In the next section, we present some of the required data: empirical information from southern Ghana on the nature, extent, and variety of social networks. The third and final item on the empirical agenda—to devise and test appropriate econometric methods—raises technical issues that lie outside the scope
of the present paper. We leave this item to future research.
A dynamic model
Montgomery and Zhao (1998) have formulated a dynamic decision model
in which individual reproductive decisions are forward-looking and are made
with respect to an evolving set of information. The individual decision model is
set in a social networks context, and information is allowed to circulate among
decisionmakers through their network ties. Each decisionmaker is endowed with
an initial set of information, but revises that information in the light of such information exchange. This approach respects the multi-level and dynamic nature
of diffusion processes.
The individual decision model is invested with features that are broadly
similar to those of Ghanaian reproductive decisionmaking. In one respect, however, the model remains incomplete. The major area requiring further work is to
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accommodate motives for birth spacing in the model as well as motives for fertility limitation. The results to be presented below are therefore only descriptive
and suggestive.
Learning through social networks
We now illustrate how such an individual decision model can be linked to
social networks and provide a tool for studying diffusion. Our purpose is mainly
to show how social effects might express themselves; we have not yet incorporated empirical data on Ghana’s social networks in the model.
We begin with a benchmark case in which women differ in their views of
contraceptive costs, but do not exchange information or revise these views through
social network contacts. (The model underlying this analysis is complex, and the
details are relegated to the Appendix.) Figure 1 shows the simulated distributions
of births and surviving children under the benchmark assumptions. (The figure
summarizes a simulation of the reproductive careers of 1000 women.) The simulated total fertility rate is 5.85, a reasonable value in the Ghanaian context, and agespecific birth rates (not shown) are also consistent with empirical data. However,
because no allowance has yet been made for birth-spacing motivations, the implied
schedules of contraceptive use differ from those in Ghana (see the Appendix).
We can compare this benchmark case to one in which women learn about
contraceptive costs through social network exchanges. The following example
may be helpful by way of illustration. Imagine that each woman i begins her
reproductive career with an initial belief about contraceptive costs. Also imagine
that each woman is endowed with a fixed reference group of five other women,
selected randomly from the population, each of whom has her own initial belief
regarding costs. Denote this reference group or information network by Ni. Woman
i may be a reference point for other women, who can gather information from
her, but she herself refers only to the members of Ni.
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Figure 1

Children ever born and surviving: Benchmark model
Ideal family size = 5. Contraception costs uniform (0,5)
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At intervals, woman i collects information about contraception from her
reference group Ni and, on the basis of this, updates her own view of costs. We
assume for simplicity that in the interim between updates, woman i ignores the
possibility of all future changes in cost beliefs.
Consider one way in which information about contraceptive costs might
be revised. A substantial literature in psychology (see Montgomery 1998 for a
review) suggests that negative information is given disproportionate weight in
the formation of perceptions and the evaluation of risks. How might such a notion be relevant to the diffusion of contraceptive use? We might think of negative
information about contraceptive costs as being summarized, for woman i, in the
most extreme view of costs that is held by a member of her reference group.
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Figure 2a

Convergence in information on contraceptive costs
Initial distribution is uniform (0,5)
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Suppose that woman i adjusts her perceived costs by averaging her own beliefs
and the worst (maximum cost) belief.
Figure 2 shows how, with successive rounds of updating (we assume that
updating takes place yearly), negative information about contraception comes to
dominate women’s views. In Figure 2a, the woman is assumed simply to average
her current belief about costs with the most extreme views found in her reference
group. This simple updating model results in a near-consensus about the high costs
of contraceptive use. The solid line in the figure shows the mean perceived costs in
the population of women, and the dotted lines show the range of views from one
standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above.
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Figure 2b

Convergence in information on contraceptive costs
Initial distribution is uniform (0,5)
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To understand this figure, it is useful to know that the initial contraceptive
cost is represented by a number randomly drawn for each woman from a uniform
(0,5) distribution with mean 2.5. The mean and standard deviation bounds are the
left-most values indicated in Figure 2a. At the first round of updating, the woman
focuses on the most extreme information about contraceptive costs that can be
found in her reference group. The expected value of this maximum in a reference
group of size n is 5n/(n+1), and with n=5, this is obviously greater than the
overall mean of 2.5. Thus, we should expect that perceptions of contraceptive
costs will tend to display an upward trend as information is exchanged. Note that
as each woman i revises her own views of contraceptive costs based on her own
reference group Ni, other women for whom woman i is a reference point will
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Figure 2c

Convergence in information on contraceptive costs
Initial distribution is uniform (0,5)
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revise their views, in part with reference to her. The consequence is that in the
population as a whole, there is a decreasing variance in perceptions of contraceptive costs, as indicated in the convergence of the standard deviation bounds about
the mean.
To continue with the example, Figure 2b shows the influence of the weight
that women place on their own views as against the negative testimony of their
reference groups. In the previous figure, women gave equal weight to their personal views and the most extreme view found in their reference group. In Figure
2b, by contrast, women pay systematically less attention to the beliefs of their
reference groups. This difference is evident in the slower upward revision of
views about costs and in the persistent of variation in the population.
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Figure 2c shows how network size might influence the distribution of views.
(We return here to the assumption of equal weights.) Suppose that reference groups
were composed of only two instead of five women. The expected value of the
most negative view found in the smaller reference group would necessarily be
lower than the expected value in a larger reference group. As a result, there is
again a slower increase in the mean perception of costs than was true in Figure
2a, as well as somewhat more persistence of variation in views.
How might these differences in information transmission affect contraceptive use? In Figure 3, we plot simulated contraceptive prevalence under two scenarios, first for the case in which women are randomly allocated their views of
contraceptive costs and do not “learn” or revise those views over their reproductive careers, and second, for the case in which they annually revise their views by
reference to a network of size five (equally weighting their views and those of
others). As can be seen, the implied differences in contraceptive prevalence are
considerable.6 All women with five surviving children, the ideal in this simulation, use contraception at ages 31 and younger; but contraceptive prevalence remains higher in the case of no learning than it does in the case of revisions based
on the average of own views and those of the reference group.
The simulation model is clearly illustrative, its main point being to demonstrate the subtleties of the diffusion perspective. Evidently, the details of behavior and social organization will matter: that is, precisely how individual social
networks are formed, how extensive they are, and what information is exchanged
within them can decisively shape aggregate trajectories of innovation. These critical modeling issues cannot be decided on the basis of theory alone. What is required is dedicated empirical work.
GHANAIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS
No one data collection exercise could hope to gather all relevant elements of
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Figure 3

Differences in contraceptive use due to learning
No learning versus weighted average
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individual information sets, the social structure in which individuals are embedded, the messages communicated along their social networks, and the new thinking
stimulated by the operation of programs and the media. It is feasible, however, to
concentrate research attention on a few of the dimensions believed to be critical to
reproductive change. In 1995, our research team gathered data in four sites in the
Central and Greater Accra regions of southern Ghana (Agyeman et al. 1996). The
purpose was twofold: to develop a portrait of the social organization of these sites,
and to measure both formal and informal social interaction concerning modern
contraception. Multiple data collection methodologies were employed, including
semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, surveys, and ethnographic
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methods. Here we provide glimpses of these data, in order to demonstrate that
measurement of social interaction is feasible and that the measures are associated
with contraceptive use in ways that are consistent with the diffusion perspective.
Contraceptive use is still uncommon in these study sites. Although a majority of reproductive-age adults have heard of modern methods such as the pill,
injectables, and the condom, only about one-quarter of women report having
used a modern method and only 10 percent report using at the time of the survey.
As is often the case in West Africa, the corresponding fractions are higher for men.
In regard to local social structure, Table 1 summarizes the main elements
of political, social, and religious organization. (Additional discussion and detailed community profiles are presented in Agyeman et al. 1996.) A striking feature is the large number of organizations in rather small communities. These
organizations include various church fellowships and associations, Town Development Committees, the 31st December Women’s Movement, PTAs, Youth Associations, and Women’s Welfare Associations. Several of these organizations
are national in character. In the ethnic Akan sites (Frami and Dutch Komenda),
there is in addition an Asafo Company, a traditional military organization for
men. Some of these organizations are gender-based, and their objectives center
around improving the socioeconomic status of community members. All sites
save Tubaman have a bewildering variety of religious associations, from Orthodox Protestant groups to Roman Catholics to all manner of syncretic churches
and traditional religions. Some of the organizations listed in Table 1 also facilitate extra-community interaction. The Football Club in Amanfro and the 31st
December Women’s Movement, for example, bring their members into contact
with people from all over Ghana. And all of the religious organizations, including the Muslim organizations in Tubaman, influence information flow to and
from the communities. Finally, in all sites exposure to the influence of radio and,
to a lesser extent, television is pervasive.
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Table 1

Characteristics of study communities and number of local influentials
Frami

Tubaman

Community characteristics
Ethnicity
Denkyira
Adangbe
Lineage type
Matrilineal
Patrilineal
Ecology
Inland, rural Inland, rural
Local influentials
Chief(s)
Queen mother(s)
Linguists
Chief fisherman
or farmer
Asafo
Religious leaders
Heads of
basic education
Town development
committee
Unit chairmen
31st December
women’s movement
leaders
Assemblyman
PTA chairman
Other influentials
Health and family
planning providers

Amanfro

Dutch
Komenda

Ga
Fante
Patrilineal Matrilineal
Inland,
Coastal, rural
peri-urban

4
3
4

1

1

1
1
3

1

2

5

5

2
1
5

1

2

2

2

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
2

1
1
1
4

1
1
1
2

Nursemidwife

Clinic,
pharmacy

PPAG,*
monthly

1

Clinic

* Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana.
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2
1
1

The novel aspect of this exploratory research was the collection of social
network data at both the individual and the community level. Our strategy was to
collect data from each respondent on the characteristics of each of his or her
network members. We first inquired about outside-compound contacts, using responses to the question “With whom do you talk most often?” to identify up to
four network contacts.7 Our intention was to emphasize interactions other than
those with spouses and near kin, who are likely to reside in the respondent’s
compound. (No doubt these near-at-hand daily interactions are also important;
we will examine them more intensively in the upcoming longitudinal research.)
The general demographic characteristics of each network member were determined (from the respondent’s report) and we then probed to learn of conversations and other exchanges regarding contraception. In a second segment of the
questionnaire, we asked about any other persons with whom modern contraception had been discussed; persons co-residing in the compound were eligible to be
included in this second battery of questions.
We were not aware of any equivalent efforts to gather social network data
in southern Ghana and, at the outset, could not rule out the possibility that respondents would be reluctant to report on network members. In the event, such
fears proved to be unfounded. The respondents reported on a relatively large
number of network members (see Table 2): an average of about three persons in
the first block of questions (those outside the compound “with whom you talk
most often”) and an average of about four persons (results not shown) in the two
blocks of questions combined. Virtually no one failed to identify network members, and over 90 percent volunteered information on two or more network members. Some 50 percent of the respondents reported on the maximum of four network members permitted in the first block of questions (those outside the
compound “with whom you talk most often”). Overall, this must be regarded as
confirmation that this strategy of inquiry can succeed in southern Ghana, at least
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Table 2 Percent distribution of number of outside-of-compound network
members, by sex of respondent

Those “with whom you talk most often
outside this compound”
No one
1 person
2 people
3 people
4 people
Mean network size

Men
(N=288)

Women
(N=312)

Total
(N=600)

2
3
20
26
49
3.2

3
12
20
15
50
3.0

2
7
20
21
50
3.1

to the extent of respondents cooperating in the basic task of reporting on their
fellow network members. A final point about Table 2 is that men reported on
slightly more network members than did women.
Respondents were asked about a selected set of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of their network members. Table 3 shows the characteristics of outside-compound network members, with attention to the differences
between network members and the respondents. Of course we expect to find a
good deal of homogeneity in personal networks, but we were also interested to
see what degree of heterogeneity characterizes them for men and women. The
table indicates that outside-compound social networks are: (1) heterogeneous
with respect to age, with high proportions of respondents reporting both older
and younger network contacts; (2) almost entirely same-sex in character; (3) composed of both kin and non-kin, the latter being more prevalent; and (4) heterogeneous with respect to schooling and, to some degree, with respect to residence as
well. There are surprisingly few male-female differences in these networks, with
perhaps the most interesting finding being the higher proportions of outside-village contacts among women. We suspect that these contacts may be the result of
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Table 3 Characteristics of outside-of-compound network members in relation
to respondent (R), by sex of respondent (percentage distributions)
Age
Younger than R
Same age
Older than R
Sex
Male
Female
Relationship
Kin
Non-kin
Schooling*
Less than R
Same as R
More than R
Residence
Same village
Other village
Town or city
Most recent conversation
Today
Yesterday
This week
Previously

Men

Women

Total

44
11
45

38
9
53

41
10
49

94
5

7
93

51
49

20
80

38
62

29
71

28
51
20

31
47
20

29
49
20

87
5
7

76
10
13

81
8
10

45
27
14
13

50
20
11
19

48
24
12
16

* Not ascertained for 2 percent of cases.

women’s roles in trading and marketing.
The conversations about contraception that occur in these personal networks are described in Table 4. This table is stratified according to the number of
network members reported by the respondent. The reason for stratifying is that,
with everything else being equal, a respondent who identifies more network members is more likely to have discussed contraception with at least one of those
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Table 4 Discussion of contraception with outside-of-compound network
members, by ever-use of contraception, sex of respondent, and number of
network members (percentages)
Never used
modern
contraception
Men Women

Ever used
modern
contraception
Men Women

Total
Men Women

Number of members
with whom contraception
was discussed:
Discussed with one

25

23

No discussion
Discussed with one
Discussed with both

61
8
31

71
11
18

No discussion
Discussed with one
Discussed with two
Discussed with all

68
12
9
12

61
11
11
17

No discussion
Discussed with one
Discussed with two
Discussed with three
Discussed with all

64
10
6
7
12

53
23
8
8
8

One network member
33
50
29
Two network members
18
35
45
27
35
15
55
30
40
Three network members
29
36
46
17
9
14
12
36
11
43
18
29
Four network members
13
23
37
13
23
12
20
18
13
20
18
14
34
18
23

27
61
18
21
55
11
17
17
43
23
11
11
11

members. Consider the “Total” columns and those respondents who mentioned
one network contact. Among these respondents, 29 percent of men and 27 percent of women reported having had a discussion with that person about modern
contraception. Among those mentioning two network contacts, 40 percent of men
reported having had a conversation with both persons and 55 percent (40 + 15)
with at least one person. Considering the majority of respondents, those who
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Table 5 Summary of contraceptive discussion with network members, by everuse of contraception and respondent’s sex
Never used
modern
contraception
Men Women
Mean number
with whom discussed
Mean percentage
with whom discussed

Ever used
modern
contraception
Men Women

Total
Men Women

0.8

0.7

2.0

1.5

1.4

0.9

26

24

61

46

43

31

reported on two to four network members, over one-half report conversations
about contraception with at least one person. Interestingly, men were somewhat
more likely than women to report conversations about contraception with at least
one of their network partners. For both sexes, however, such conversations are
relatively common. It seems that there is a good deal of interpersonal interaction
about contraception in these villages.
Table 4 also examines the association between interpersonal interaction
regarding contraception and use of modern contraception. Analysis of precisely
this linkage is the long-term goal of the research program, motivated by the theory
and other research described earlier. The materials at hand are limited to a single
cross-section snapshot of a dynamic relationship; we cannot hope on this basis to
identify the causal impact of network interaction on contraceptive behavior. Until we have gathered the appropriate prospective data, analysis of the sort presented in Table 4 is nevertheless of interest, for two reasons. First, it contributes
to our evaluation of the validity of this data collection strategy: we assume that
those who have used modern contraception are more likely to have discussed it
with friends and relatives, and therefore we would question the validity of the
reports of conversations about modern contraception if these were not reported
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Table 6 Contraceptive discussion with types of network members, by ever-use
of contraception and respondent’s sex (percentages)
Never used
modern
contraception
Men Women
Age
Younger than R
Same age
Older than R
Sex
Male
Female
Relationship to R
Kin
Non-kin
Schooling
Less than R
Same as R
More than R
Residence
Same village
Other village
Town or city
Most recent conversation
Today
Yesterday
Previously
All network members

Ever used
modern
contraception
Men Women

Total
Men Women

20
27
28

24
26
25

67
47
58

55
57
38

44
36
44

33
34
29

25
19

16
25

60
64

47
46

43
48

25
31

21
26

19
28

59
61

44
47

42
44

34
27

15
28
25

28
23
24

56
64
62

44
47
48

40
44
44

34
30
29

24
17
37

26
16
27

61
52
63

50
29
31

43
33
52

33
19
28

24
25
26
26

27
26
19
24

66
56
56
61

48
47
42
46

46
40
42
43

34
31
26
31

to be more common among ever-users. Second, the figures in Table 4 give a
rough indication of the direction and strength of interpersonal diffusion.
Almost without exception, respondents who have ever used modern contraception are much more likely to report having conversations about contracep-
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tion with fellow network members. The association between interpersonal interaction and use is strongly positive. Table 5 distills the findings in two summary
indicators: for contraceptive users and non-users, the mean number and the mean
percentage of persons with whom conversations have occurred. For example, among
men, ever-users have discussed modern contraception with 2.0 network members
on average, as against 0.8 network members among never-users. These results are
strikingly similar to the findings of Valente et al. (1997) and Watkins et al. (1995).
Further details on the likelihood of conversations about modern contraception occurring are given in Table 6. The likelihood that contraception is discussed
is shown according to characteristics of the network members (as well as the sex
and contraceptive use status of the respondent). This table offers rich material for
addressing a host of questions about social interaction and contraception. One can,
for example, ask questions about the association between network heterogeneity
and discussions of contraception. Granovetter’s (1973) argument that “weak ties”
are more conducive to the diffusion of innovative ideas implies that information
about contraception is more likely to be exchanged in outside-village network contacts and among non-kin. The figures in Table 6 do not show such limits on contraceptive information exchange; it seems to occur with outside contacts and those
inside the village, between kin and non-kin, among those with greater schooling
than the respondent and with less, and so on. Socioeconomic factors may well
facilitate or constrain discussion of contraception, but identifying the precise patterns will require further research.
CONCLUSIONS
The term “diffusion” has appeared in the literature on fertility transition
with increasing frequency during the past two decades. This paper has provided
a more precise definition of diffusion than is the norm in the literature, and has
considered how diffusion effects might be expressed and what they might imply
for the timing and pace of fertility change.
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As used here, diffusion refers to a process in which individuals’ decisions—
in this instance, decisions bearing on reproduction—are affected by the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of others with whom they come in contact. This
contact might occur through face-to-face social interaction with kin, friends, and
neighbors or, at the other extreme, through interactions at a distance through the
mass media. Two fundamental behavioral mechanisms account for such diffusion effects: social learning and social influence. Social learning refers to the
acquisition of information from others. The information might have to do with a
new technology, or with the health, social, and economic consequences of decisions. In the case of fertility, individuals might learn from others about the availability of a new contraceptive, or about health side effects of certain contraceptives, or about the apparent gains and losses from having fewer children and
investing in their schooling. Social influence refers to the power that individuals
exercise over each other through authority, deference, and pressures for social
conformity. In the case of fertility, spouses and other kin may forbid practice of
contraception (and have the means to enforce this prohibition), or individuals
may be reluctant to depart from community reproductive practices out of fears of
social marginalization.
Although social learning and social influence undoubtedly operate in every
setting, it is likely that their effects are more powerful in environments of uncertainty, where the costs and benefits of decisions are poorly understood. The uncertainty can be induced by forces such as demographic changes (reductions in mortality), rapid introduction of technological innovations, transformations in the
economy, the improvement of transportation and communication infrastructure,
and the expanded provision of public services by government and private agencies.
Such forces, often perceived by individuals as being out of their control, leave
them both bewildered and insecure about appropriate behavioral responses. In such
environments, it is natural to seek guidance from others, whether as sources of essential information or as models of how to respond to the changes that are underway.
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This paper has emphasized the role of individual networks and local social
structure, but as others have argued (e.g., Bongaarts and Watkins 1996), national
and even international networks should also be considered. The political and
bureaucratic commitments needed to sustain delivery of family planning and health
services are no doubt strengthened by an interlocking series of networks. These
serve to link, at one end, international donors and providers of technical assistance with groups of in-country policymakers and program managers, at the other
end. Such connections are brought to the fore in Watkins’s analysis of the development of population policy in Kenya (Watkins and Hodgson 1998).
It has been a common practice in the research literature of the past two
decades on fertility transition to set diffusionist theory against conventional theory.
This opposition is incompatible with the model developed in this paper, in which
diffusion effects and the effects of demographic, social, and economic factors are
inseparable. Diffusion dynamics—the expression of social learning and social
influence—are one means through which the fundamental factors operate.
This is a central point of the argument we have developed, and perhaps can
be made clearer by illustration. Consider the response of fertility to mortality
decline. According to the argument developed here, the magnitude of the population-level response depends in part on what individuals conclude from their own
observations and from their discussions with others about improvements in survival chances. Similarly, emerging employment opportunities for women will
alter reproductive strategies only to the extent that households are made aware of
these opportunities through mass media channels and informal social interaction,
and to the extent that social constraints do not prevent women from pursuing
these opportunities. Much the same logic can be applied to many conventional
explanatory variables.
If the causal process leading to fertility decline operates in this way, then
clearly it makes little sense to impose a conceptual boundary between diffusion
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effects and the effects of exogenous economic and social variables; and there can
be no support for the view that the two sets of effects are alternative and competing explanations for fertility decline. Rather, diffusion dynamics occupy a position of a different character in the causal model of fertility decline: they condition or mediate the effects of other variables, either dampening or amplifying
their effects. Diffusion and conventional explanatory variables can coexist comfortably in a well-specified theory of social change.
If one accepts this view, then the research challenge is to make an accurate
and balanced assessment of the nature and magnitude of diffusion effects. Two
strategies for carrying out such an assessment are presented in this paper. The
first strategy uses micro-simulations in which an individual woman’s contraceptive practice is responsive to the knowledge and practice of contraception in her
social network. Despite the simple structure of the simulation model employed
here, it clearly illustrates the subtleties of the diffusion perspective.
In the simulation model, the likelihood of using contraception is influenced by contact with other persons. The simulations illustrate how the magnitude of the influence depends on the size of a woman’s social network and on the
weight she attaches to the information she receives from network partners. Evidently, the details of behavior and social organization matter: how individual
social networks are formed, how extensive they are, and what information is exchanged within them can decisively shape aggregate trajectories of innovation.
These parameters are inputs to the simulations and, given the present state
of knowledge, the choice of values is arbitrary. The simulations will become
more informative to the extent that the parameters correctly describe social processes in specific settings. The key information is not yet known for societies that
are now undergoing transition from high to low fertility, and hence the social
network and related parameters must be measured through dedicated empirical
studies.
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The second strategy involves collection of the necessary primary data, as
we have done through fieldwork initiated in Ghana in 1995. Descriptive results
from our first attempts to measure social networks and link them to contraception
were presented. The exercise provides considerable encouragement that empirical work on this topic is feasible. In the focused inquiry about social networks,
virtually none of the Ghanaian respondents failed to identify a network member,
and over 90 percent volunteered information on two or more members. The reported characteristics of these network relationships seem reasonable, in particular showing male-female differences that are plausible in Ghanaian society The
data also reveal that conversations about contraception are relatively common in
the sampled communities, having occurred in roughly one-half of the network
relationships (and, interestingly, more frequently for men than women). Finally,
a strong positive association is apparent between such conversations about contraception and the likelihood of having used modern contraception.
This empirical association is consistent with the theory developed in the
first part of this paper, but it would be premature to claim empirical verification
of the theory. If the decision to use contraception can be attributed in part to
social diffusion effects, then contraceptive users should report more social interaction about contraception than non-users, just as observed in the Ghanaian data.
But this association can also be explained by a process in which individuals make
a decision to use contraception in isolation, uninfluenced by the contraceptive
attitudes and behaviors of members of their social network, and then, having
adopted contraception, proceed to discuss it with those members. Individuals
might even decide to affiliate themselves with others who are known to have
made the same innovative choice. That is, the presence of contraceptive users in
an individual’s social network, and the discussion of contraception with friends
and neighbors, might follow from, rather than precede, the decision to use contraception. Either causal process is compatible with the Ghanaian data.
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With reflection, it becomes clear that this matter cannot be resolved with a
single cross-section study measuring social interaction patterns and contraceptive attitudes and behaviors. Indeed, short of pure experimental design, no strategy will yield an unambiguous portrait of the causal structure. But if social interaction patterns and contraceptive use are jointly tracked over time, the analytical
capacity to disentangle stimulus from response is significantly strengthened.
Building on the exploratory materials described here, we have established such a
longitudinal research program in Ghana. The overarching aim of this program is
to make an empirical assessment of the scope and scale of diffusion effects on
reproductive behavior, with particular attention to the practice of contraception.
The design will also permit a host of corollary issues to be addressed, including:
the density and composition of social networks and how these vary by sex, age,
schooling, ethnicity, social organization of the community, and other variables;
the content of discussion about modern contraception and, in particular, the relative weight of positive and negative messages; the effect of local health and family planning services on the prevalence and content of discussion about contraception and related issues; and the prevalence of discussion about modern
contraception per se as against discussion of broader issues concerning the costs
and benefits of childbearing and childrearing. Each of these issues can have considerable bearing on the direction and magnitude of diffusion effects on fertility.
The significance of this work for the design and evaluation of programs is
clear. If diffusion dynamics have substantial effects on reproductive decisions,
then surely the design of programs should be sensitive to this fact and, indeed,
exploit it to the extent possible. Programs should nurture positive diffusion effects and deliberately counter negative diffusion effects. In a similar vein, efforts
to evaluate program impact will be biased if they ignore the “spillover” and “multiplier” effects that social diffusion dynamics produce; hence practicable methods
for accounting for diffusion effects in program evaluation must be developed.
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APPENDIX
In what follows, we sketch the main assumptions and methods employed in
the simulation model described above. Montgomery and Zhao (1998) gives additional details. We focus on women and women’s social networks in this simulation.
The individual model
The full reproductive span for a woman ranges from age t0 to T, where we
take t0 to be age 15 and T to be age 45. Within this reproductive span, age t is
indexed in months. The terminal age T is defined to be the oldest age at which
conception probabilities are non-zero. Women first marry at age tm, an age that is
randomly drawn from a first marriage age schedule for Ghana. We assume that
no reproduction takes place before tm and also assume that all marriages remain
intact until the terminal reproductive age T. (We hope to generalize future versions of the model to accommodate marriage dissolution and remarriage.) Each
woman possesses an ideal family size š, which can be regarded as a target number
of surviving children. Beginning in month tm, she strives to reach š in an optimal
fashion over the course of her reproductive career.
Because reproductive outcomes cannot be perfectly controlled, a woman
may either fall short in her attempt to meet the target š or exceed the target. She
may be prevented from reaching š by infant or child mortality, which remains
high in Ghana. The risk of such mortality is expressed in an age schedule of
mortality hazards ma for a child of age a, with the values of ma drawn from life
tables based on Demographic and Health Survey data (Ghana Statistical Service
and Macro International 1994). The woman can also overshoot š through unintended conceptions, or she can fail to conceive and thereby undershoot š.
In striving to reach š, the woman makes use of a single control variable,
denoted by ct, which indicates a decision to use modern contraception in month t
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(that is, ct = 1) or not. Regulating fertility in this way is not costless, however, and
modern contraceptive use entails two sorts of costs. First, each month of contraceptive use exacts a penalty cc, the level of which is expressed in terms of the
woman’s utility. Second, contraceptive use also exposes the woman to the risk of
health side effects. Having such health problems (a situation expressed by ht = 1)
reduces the woman’s monthly utility by an amount hc. If she uses contraception,
she faces the probability ph of contracting such a side effect. A woman who has
such a side effect can abandon contraceptive use; if she does, her monthly probability of recovery from the side effect is given by rn. If she continues to use
contraception, however, the monthly probability of recovery is given by rc < rn.
Of course, contraceptive use also promises utility benefits in that it reduces the probability of conception. The age schedule of fecundability is denoted
by fnt, and a woman who uses modern contraception faces reduced risks of conception, as expressed in the schedule fct = β · fnt with β < 1. If she conceives,
there is a 9-month gestation period to be endured (months of pregnancy are indexed by gt) and, following birth, a 17-month period of postpartum amenorrhea
and sexual abstinence.
To summarize, the state variables for the model are as follows. The number of surviving children, as of mother’s age t, is denoted by st. The number of
months since her last birth is given by at and the survival status of the last birth is
indicated by lt, where lt = 1 means that the child is still alive. (These two state
variables are assigned default values for women who have not yet had any births.)
The indicator ht expresses the woman’s health status at age t, with ht = 1 meaning
that she has a health side effect that is traceable to contraceptive use. Nonpregnant women have gestation indicator gt = 0, whereas gt indexes the month of
pregnancy for pregnant women.
By “optimal,” we mean that the woman is assumed to act so as to maximize utility over her reproductive lifetime. Lifetime utility is given by the sum-
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mation of a sequence of age-specific utility functions ut(st, at, lt, ht, gt, θ), and a
terminal value function U(sT, aT, lT, hT, gT, θ), with θ a vector of decision parameters. Let the full state vector be given by yt = (st, at, lt, ht, gt). In this notation, the
expected utility derived over a reproductive career is

 T –1

Etm ∑ ut ( yt, ct,θ ) + U ( yT ,θ )
 t = tm

where Etm denotes expectations formulated as of the woman’s age at marriage tm.
Since the decision horizon is finite, ending at T, the states are discretevalued, and the (single) control variable is also discrete, optimal contraceptive
decisions are readily determined by the method of backwards recursion. Montgomery (1989) develops a number of demographic models in this vein; also see
Wolpin (1998) for a simple example involving child mortality, and Rust (1994)
for a review of the related econometric literature.
Implementing the decision model
To proceed, we require functional forms for the period utility function ut(yt,

θ) and the terminal value function U(yT, θ). For simplicity, we define the period
utility function to be
ut = – (st – š )2 – ht · hc – ct · cc,
in which deviations from the family size ideal š are penalized in a quadratic and
symmetric fashion. Such symmetry is perhaps implausible, in that one might
expect smaller penalties for exceeding š in societies like Ghana’s that have been
organized to manage high fertility. (We will explore non-symmetric versions of
ut in future work.) Note that period utility ut is not discounted in this formulation,
although doing so would be an easy generalization.
As for the terminal value function,
∞

U = –κ ET ( sT – sˇ )2 – ET ( ∑ hv ⋅ hc cT = 0).
v=T
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The factor κ > 1 is employed to inflate the value of U in relation to period utility
ut. Expectations are required in defining U because women may be pregnant
(gT > 0) upon entering period T and the ensuing birth may or may not survive. In
addition, women can enter T with a health condition (hT = 1) that was the result of
prior contraceptive use and this condition may persist for some time even in the
absence of contraceptive use. The expected health cost can be summarized as
equal to hc/rn if hT = 1 and as equal to zero otherwise.
Neither ut nor U contains terms that reflect motivations for birth spacing;
rather, each is specified only in numbers of surviving children. Two spacing
motivations will be investigated in future work. First, we will explore whether
postpartum sexual abstinence can be viewed as a traditional contraceptive method
for which modern methods might substitute. Second, it may be possible to generalize the model so that the mortality risks faced by children depend on the preceding birth interval, thus adding another motivation for birth spacing. For the
moment, however, we have chosen a single mortality schedule ma that depends
on the child’s age but not on the preceding birth interval.
To implement the model, we are also required to select a schedule of
fecundability by age, fnt, choose a value for contraceptive efficacy β, and specify
the trio of transition probabilities that are associated with health (ph, rc, rn). The
utility parameters hc, cc, and κ must also be specified.
The chosen parameter values are as follows for the baseline runs. The direct contraceptive cost parameter cc = 2.5; the health cost parameter hc = 2.5;
the monthly probability of contracting a health side effect if using contraception
is ph = .25; and the monthly probability of recovery is rc = .1 when contraception continues to be used and rn = .9 if it is not used. The weighting factor κ for
the terminal value function is set to κ = 10. Contraceptive efficacy β = .05, and
the mortality schedule is chosen so that 5q0 matches the values for the central
region of Ghana. See Montgomery and Zhao (1998) for further discussion.
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Baseline results without networks
Using a baseline set of parameter values and demographic schedules, we
have simulated contraceptive decisions and reproductive outcomes for a birth
cohort of women whose ideal family size is š = 5 children. Women differ in their
initial views of the direct costs of contraception, such that they are distributed
uniformly across the range of possible costs from low to high. The model assumes that for each woman i, the parameter cci is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution with range [0,5]. The mean value of cci is thus 2.5. We assume
that each woman retains her initial view of costs (the value of cci ) throughout her
reproductive career. In this benchmark model, then, no learning about contraceptive costs takes place.
Although the fertility rates produced by such a model are encouragingly
similar to those reported in the Ghana DHS, the profiles of contraceptive use
implied by the model (not shown) are distinct from those seen in the DHS data.
Given an ideal family size š = 5, the model predicts the following: essentially no
contraceptive use among women with three or fewer surviving children; some
“precautionary” contraceptive use among those with four children (see Montgomery 1989 for a discussion of the precautionary motive in dynamic models of
target fertility); and, initially at least, universal contraceptive use among women
with five or more surviving children. Holding the number of surviving children
constant at four or more, contraceptive use declines with the woman’s age, this
being a consequence of declining fecundability, which reduces the risks of nonuse. The Ghana DHS, by contrast, shows appreciable contraceptive use among
women with fewer surviving children than their expressed ideal, behavior that
must reflect motives for birth spacing not captured in our simulation model. The
DHS data also show that at no parity is contraceptive use universal; rather, the
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peak probability of use for women exposed to conception risk is about .35. Clearly,
to match these features of the DHS profiles, the simulation model must be generalized to include spacing motivations.
Modeling heterogeneity and learning
We now compare the benchmark case to one in which women learn about
contraceptive costs through social network exchanges. The following example
may be helpful by way of illustration. Imagine that each woman i is endowed
with an initial value for cci precisely as above. Also imagine that each woman i is
endowed with a fixed reference group of five other women, selected randomly
from the population, each with her own initial value of cc. Denote this reference
group or information network by Νi. Woman i may be a reference point for other
women, who draw information from her, but she herself refers only to the members of Νi.
At intervals, woman i draws information about contraception from her reference group Νi and, on the basis of this, updates her own views of costs, generating
a new value of cci. For example, having first updated her cost view (cci) at age t1,
she proceeds to solve again the dynamic decision problem, which is to maximize

 T –1

Et 1 ∑ ut ( yt, ct, θ ) + U ( yT , θ )
 t = t1

taking as given the value of the state vector yt . The procedure is repeated upon
1

the next infusion of information at t1+ ∆. In the interim between t1 and t1+ ∆,
woman i acts according to the revised dynamic decision rules that are based, in
part, on her revised views of contraceptive costs. We assume for simplicity that
in the interim, woman i behaves myopically in the sense that she ignores the
possibility of all future changes in such costs.
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Notes
1

Research on Ghana involves John Casterline, Mark Montgomery, and James
Phillips at the Population Council; in Ghana, Fred Binka and Alex Nazzar
of the Navrongo Health Research Centre and, in a parallel research program in the south, Dominic Agyeman of the University of Cape Coast.
Preliminary findings are presented in Phillips et al. (1997b) and Agyeman
et al. (1996). Similar research is being conducted by Susan Watkins and
colleagues in Kenya and Malawi (see Watkins et al. 1995 for preliminary
results) and a comparable effort is in progress in northeastern Thailand
(Entwisle and Godley 1998).

2

Manski (1993a) has developed an interesting model of social learning from
peers, but a key assumption is that individuals are identical in all dimensions affecting the equations of motion.

3

Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) see similar patterns in contemporary developing countries.

4

These data were later reanalyzed by Montgomery and Chung (forthcoming) and Valente (1995).

5

See, among others, Arrow (1994), Arthur and Lane (1992), Banerjee (1992,
1993), Besley and Case (1993), Bikhchandandi et al. (1992), Conlisk (1980,
1996), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), Foster and Rosenzweig (1994),
Kohler (1997), Manski (1993a,b), McFadden and Train (1996), Munshi
(1994), Munshi and Myaux (1998), and Shiller (1995).

6

As discussed in the Appendix, the figures show a reduction in contraceptive use with age, holding constant the number of surviving children. This
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decline is the result of declining fecundability, which reduces motivation
for contraceptive use.
7

In earlier pilot research, we allowed for more than four network partners.
The decision to truncate the list at four is the product of a compromise: the
lower the truncation point, the greater the potential bias; but the greater the
number of network partners considered, the greater the risk of respondent
fatigue and perfunctory replies. In the longitudinal research currently in
the field, we first obtain a full list of network partners and then make detailed inquiries for four of these. This alternative approach will permit (limited) analyses of truncation bias.
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